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HAND COUNTED PAPER AUDITS Home Page
2. Paper Audits
How Can Independent Paper Audits Detect and Correct Vote Miscounts?
How can we Ensure Accurate Election Results via Independent Audits & Election Data Monitoring?
What election data can Election Offices collect and publicly release in order to Monitor Elections for accuracy?
Not Audits per Se. These are the procedures for obtaining and uploading election results to US Count the Votes.
Report generated by Verified Voting.
Example of legislation requiring a 5% audits.
ES&S V0TING SYSTEMS
The report covers the Unity Election Management System, the M100 Precinct Ballot Counter, the M550 Central Ballot Counter and the M650
Central Ballot Counter. Some redaction.
Report to Ohio SoS authored by Compuware. Evaluates Diebold, E,S&S, Hart Intercivic and Sequoia systems.
Douglas Jones, University of Iowa. Process recommendations for the most part. Sections 11, 12, and 13 address some
hardware/software issues. It is not a security audit. The E,S&S hardware referred to did not have the ability to print
paper ballots.
The PEB is a removable card that is key to the operation of the iVotronic system. The thread discusses the card, but
includes a caution on the use of IR/Scanners in counting absentee ballots.
OFFICIAL GAO REPORT
Overview of concerns, life cycle considerations (107 pages).
Provides an overview of the GAO report--page references included.
MISSOURI ELECTION CODE
Missouri Revised Statutes - Links to Title IX
Missouri Code 15 CSR 30-10
MISSOURI SUNSHINE LAW, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION & PUBLIC RECORDS
Missouri Revised Code - Chapter 610
Link to the AGO web site
Quick guide to the Sunshine Law by the Missouri Press - Bar Commission
POTENTIAL TECHNICAL & SECURITY GLITCHES WITH E-VOTING
Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems (July 2002)
A Practical Strategy for Achieving Information Assurance in Today's Highly Networked Environments, NSA Security Recommendation Guide, 8 June 2001.
An Election Reform Information Project study that discusses recounts and VVPATS, recount triggers, and
manual audits (October 2005). Good state overview of various items analyzed.
4. Scanners
This article, by Douglas Jones at the University of Iowa, is about three years old, but it gives a pretty fair
overview of ballot scanning technology. Near the end of it there is a long section on legal considerations and
another recommending standatds for voting machines (scanners) that would require vendors to disclose
information about scanners, including spectral response.
New mathematical functions for estimating exit poll discrepancies from the National Election Data Archive
(Jan. 2006). May be useful in audits of large counties.
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