Missourians for Honest Elections
Position Paper on DREs, May 2008
Missourians for Honest Elections (MOHE) is a non-partisan group that came together in 2005 over the shared belief that our democratic process is not functioning well, and a shared conviction to make it work better. We are particularly concerned about the use of direct record, touch screen voting machines (DREs), and have been engaged in many efforts to educate the public, elected officials, and local election authorities about the alarming problems associated with this technology. We find DREs to be unacceptable because they jeopardize our democracy in the following ways:
1.) DREs give unverifiable election results. It is impossible for election authorities to be sure that DREs have counted votes accurately because DREs do not provide a means for an independent audit of the election results—that is, an audit that does not depend on the software that gave the results in the first place. The “paper trail” required for DREs used in Missouri does not serve this purpose because it runs on the same software as the DRE to which it is connected. Moreover, as the CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project has testified before Congress, it can be manipulated to hide vote tampering, and research shows that voters cannot be relied upon to check its accuracy as they are voting. (See “Testimony on Voter Verification: Presentation to Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,” CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, June 2005, pg. 2.)
2.) DREs violate the privacy of the vote. The privacy of the vote is compromised whenever a voter requires help voting on a DRE, which occurs frequently with these machines. In order to provide assistance, the election judge must have access to the ballot screen. Another DRE privacy concern is that the “paper trail” records the votes in the order in which voters have voted. This makes it possible for election officials to match the voter with the vote.
3.) DREs pose serious security risks. No lock exists that can secure a DRE if it is already loaded with software that contains hidden malicious code; and computer scientists agree that it is nearly impossible to detect such code, even under the most thorough software review. As for the physical security of the machine itself, there have been many rigorous studies that have demonstrated that the DREs certified for use in our state can be tampered with in such a way as to change election results, even under polling place conditions. The following are some of the specific security risks that pertain to the DREs certified for use in Missouri:
. A 2007 study conducted by the California Secretary of State found that the protective seals on the Sequoia Edge (used in Greene, Cole, Butler and Calloway Counties) were “easily bypassed” and that “other security-critical parts of the system were accessed by simply unscrewing a few screws.” (Source: “Security Evaluation of the Sequoia Voting System: Public Report, Computer Security Group, Department of Computer Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, pg. 9.)
. Computer scientists hired by the California Secretary of State “were able to violate the physical security of every aspect” of the Diebold (now “Premier”) Accuvote TSx (used in the City of St. Louis and Kansas City) “under polling place conditions using tools found in a typical office.” (Source: “Withdrawal of Approval of Diebold Elections Systems, State of California, Oct. 2007, Revision, pg. 3.)
. A 2007 study conducted by the Ohio Secretary of State found that a voter equipped with a Palm Pilot (which can be used to emulate a poll worker’s memory card) can quickly and surreptitiously “take complete control” of the ES&S iVotronic (used in St. Louis County). (Source: “Everest: Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment Standards and Testing,” Final Report, Dec. 2007, pg. 70.)
4.) DREs are mechanically unreliable. DREs are notorious for having technical problems during elections: failing to start up, breaking down, recording “overvotes” (more votes than voters who signed in to vote), skipping pages on the ballot, losing ballots, etc. (See www.votersunite.org/news.asp
for a list of problems that have been reported from around the nation.) Here in Missouri we have had our share of technical difficulties, including several cases in which a vote for one candidate appeared
as a vote for another on the screen (known as “vote flipping.”) (Source: Telephone Logs from the Secretary of State’s Election Division, Nov., 2006). Please see the attached Appendix for MOHE’s review of the performance of St. Louis County’s DREs.
-----------
In order to address such concerns as we have described above, many states have recently switched—or are now in the process of switching—to a paper-based system using optical scan machines. It would be very easy and inexpensive for Missouri to make such a change, as optical scan machines are already used throughout the state. While these machines also run on software that may contain malicious code, and they, too, have been proven to be hackable, they are a much more acceptable alternative to DREs for the following reasons: (1) the hand-marked paper ballot that they read is a voter-verified, software-independent record that can be hand-counted for a truly independent audit; (2) the ballot can be marked in absolute privacy, with voters rarely needing assistance; (3) the opportunity for tampering is greatly reduced because only one machine is needed per polling place—one optical scan machine is much easier to monitor than a row of DREs.
In view of all of the problems associated with DREs and the better alternative that is readily available, DREs should be prohibited in the state of Missouri before the November 2008 election. If paper ballot-marking devices for the disabled cannot be purchased by this deadline, as a temporary solution DREs should be limited to one per polling place, to be used only by the disabled (as California is doing). In addition, the state should require random, hand-counted audits designed to achieve a 95% statistical certainty that the will of the voters has been accurately reflected by the optical scan machines.
--------------
Questions? Want to join us? Contact Missourians for Honest Elections at (314) 727-6586, or email crichar03@yahoo.com, or gingerharris@charter.net.
APPENDIX
1. Results of MOHE’s Review of the Performance of St. Louis County’s ES&S DREs during the February, 2008 Presidential Primary:
There were 1,265 ES&S iVotronic DREs with printers in use during the election.
Total printer problem reports (many involving more than one printer): 89
--including one report of “36 votes not recorded on paper trail.”
Other examples: “no printer detected,” “broken paper lock key,” “printer drawer will not lock,” “printer not printing,” “paper jam” (24 reports), “printer error,” “printer not found,” etc.
Total DRE-related problem reports not involving printers (many involving more than one machine): 92
--including 14 reports of “calibration” issues, 9 reports of “audio ballot” problems, 4 reports of “mistaken undervoting,” and one report of “lost iVotronic terminal.”
Other examples: “iVO count off,” “would not start up,” “power outage,” “no starting count,” “blank screen,” “low voltage,” “seal removed at start-up,” “blank ballot cast,” “ballot disappearing,” “etc.
Total DRE-related problem reports, including printer problem reports: 181
This is an average of 14 problems for every 100 DREs deployed, or a “failure rate” of 14%.
(Data tallied from the “Tech Call Center Sheets” and “Tech Maintenance Logs” obtained from the St. Louis County Board of Elections.)
Please note: This is a conservative total in that we did not include numerous reports of “check power,” “check printer paper,” “check time,” and “check date.” We did not include these because we could not tell whether this maintenance work was in response to a problem or simply routine.
2. Results of MOHE’s Review of the Performance of St. Louis County’s ES&S DREs during the November, 2006 Midterm Election:
There were 1,716 ES&S iVotronic DREs with printers in use during the election.
Total printer problem reports (many involving more than one printer): 137
--including 82 reports of “printer jam,” and one report of a vote incorrectly recorded on the paper trail.
Other examples: “printers not printing,” “DRE not communicating with printer,” “paper not advancing,” “printer stopped in mid vote,” “broken printer,” “no printer found on screen,” “no ink print,” etc.
Total DRE-related problem reports not involving printers (many involving more than one machine): 57
--including one report of “touch screen does not vote for person they select;” and one report of an “uncredentialed stranger” having had access to a DRE for fifteen minutes.
Other examples: “no touch screen working,” “touch screen frozen,” “blank screen,” “iVO completely dead,” “iVO not responding,” “2 touch screens broken,” “3 iVOs down,” etc.
Total DRE-related problem reports, including printer problems: 194
This is an average of 11 problems for every 100 DREs deployed, or a “failure rate” of 11%.
(Data tallied from the “Tech Call Center Sheets” and “Tech Maintenance Logs” obtained from the St. Louis County Board of Elections.)